This study assesses the role of the Asian …nancial crisis of the late 1990s in the emergence and persistence of the large current account surpluses across non-China emerging Asia, which have been a signi…cant counterpart to the U.S. current account de…cit. Using panel data encompassing nearly 3,750 …rms, we trace the current account surpluses to a marked and broad-based decline in corporate expenditures on …xed investment in the aftermath of the crisis that cuts across a wide spectrum of countries, industries, and …rms. The lower corporate spending in turn depressed aggregate investment rates, widened the saving-investment gap, and allowed the region to turn into a net exporter of capital. We then consider the factors behind this reduction in postcrisis corporate investment. While weaker …rm-level fundamentals in the postcrisis period seem to explain part of the drop in investment rates, ongoing re-structuring owing to large debts accumulated and excess investment undertaken in the run-up to the crisis has been the main source of restraint postcrisis corporate investment. The results suggest that even after a decade, the e¤ect of the …nancial crisis is still a¤ecting corporate investment decisions in emerging Asia, and that as the restructuring completes its course, investment rates will likely rise to contribute to a gradual reduction in the region's current account surpluses.
Introduction
In the aftermath of the East Asian …nancial crisis of 1997 and 1998, the ratio of aggregate investment to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in emerging Asia excluding China fell from an average of around 33 percent to about 25 percent, and has remained at about this level in subsequent years. At the same time, aggregate savings as percent of GDP in these countries have declined only slightly, leading to a swing in the current account balances from slight de…cits in the period leading up to the crisis to substantial surpluses in the postcrisis era. These surpluses enabled the region to become an exporter capital in de…ance of theory suggesting that capital should ‡ow from capital-abundant to capital-scarce countries where returns on capital are higher. Indeed, data on the patterns of global current account imbalances indicate that the wider saving-investment gap for the region has been a signi…cant counterpart to the large current account de…cits in the United States since 1997, suggesting a possible role of the Asian …nancial crisis in the emergence of global imbalances.
Global imbalances, the growing current account de…cit of the United States and the corresponding current account surpluses and accumulation of foreign exchange reserves in others countriesmainly in East Asia and, more recently, in oil-exporting economies-have been portrayed as perhaps the most important risk to the global economy. Chief among the risks is the possibility that the imbalances could unwind abruptly, with sharp contractions in assets prices (including the U.S. dollar), paving the way for a global …nancial and economic crisis. Concerns of this nature have been voiced by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ [2000] , Blanchard et al. [2005] , Mussa [2004] , and others. 1 The quest to understand the causes of these imbalances and how they might unwind has generated a considerable amount of research that has tended to emphasize four broad explanations: di¤erences in stages of demographic transitions (Feroli, 2003; Ferrero, 2002) , di¤erences in economic growth (Engel and Rogers, 2005) , heterogeneity in stages of …nancial market development (Caballero et. al, 2006; Mendoza et al., 2007) , and emerging market …nancial crises (Bernanke, 2005; Kamin and Gruber, 2007) . 2 The contribution of this paper is in spirit of the fourth explanation. Bernanke [2005] was among the early advocates of the view that …nancial crises in emerging markets contributed to the emergence of global imbalances. He argues that the global imbalances owe to the availability of excess saving (or a savings glut) from overseas that has …nanced the U.S. current account de…cit. Bernanke notes that the global excess saving has mainly originated 1 Additional references include Mann [2004] , and Roubini and Setser [2004] . 2 See also, Hubbard (2006) , Prasad et al. (2006) , Ju and Wei (2006) , Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2005) and others. 2 in emerging market economies, a development that he attributes to the series of …nancial crises, including the Asian …nancial crises in the 1990s. Gruber and Kamin [2007] more formally test this hypothesis for emerging Asia and con…rm the predominant role of the Asian …nancial crisis as an explanation for the patterns of global imbalances. Using aggregate data and a panel regression model similar to the approach in Chinn and Prasad [2003] , they …nd that none of the standard fundamental determinants of current accounts can explain either the large surpluses in emerging Asia or the large U.S. current account de…cit unless the model is augmented to account for the Asian …nancial crisis of the late 1990s. They conclude that the Asian …nancial crisis played a key role in promoting current account surpluses for the economies in the region.
Our study extends this line of inquiry by attempting to uncover the mechanism that links the decade old …nancial crisis to the current account surpluses in non-China emerging Asia. While the link between the crisis and current account surpluses has been established by previous research, the mechanisms through which it might be occurring remain a open question. There are two main channels through which the …nancial crisis could have caused the region to run current account surpluses. The …rst (more direct) channel suggests that the postcrisis current account surpluses are the result of private optimizing behavior in the aftermath of the crisis. For example, the crisis could have disrupted …nancial intermediation within the economy resulting in a credit crunch or the crisis could have weakened the balances sheets of …rms prompting prolonged cut backs in corporate investment spending. The second (indirect) channel suggests that the current account surpluses could be the result of shifts in government policies in the aftermath of the crisis such as keeping exchange rates undervalued to promote export-led growth, and to help accumulate foreign exchange reserves as a bu¤er against future crises (see for example Mann [2004] ).
Disentangling the source of the postcrisis investment drag has important implications for the future adjustment of these imbalances. If the surpluses are the consequence of optimal private behavior, one might expect the imbalances between saving and investment to narrow as the e¤ect of the …nancial crisis fades. If, as advocated by some studies, the surpluses are the result of deliberate government policies to promote economic development through export-led growth, they could persist for the foreseeable future. To better understand the link between the …nancial crisis and current account surpluses, we use a large cross-country panel data set of 3,750 publicly traded …rms in eight emerging Asian countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand). Using …rm level data a¤ords the unique opportunity to con-3 duct a granular assessment of the determinants of investment, and to study the mechanism through which the …nancial crisis could be a¤ecting investment dynamics in the region. To our knowledge, this is the …rst comprehensive micro study on the determinants of emerging Asia's current account surpluses and on the unique role of the …nancial crisis.
The results from the study con…rm the predominant role of the …nancial crisis in generating the current account surpluses in the region since 1998. We …nd that the shortfall in the region's aggregate investment that generated the current account surpluses owes to a marked and broadbased decline in corporate spending on …xed investment in the aftermath of the crisis that cuts across a wide spectrum of countries, industries, and …rms. We then consider the factors behind the postcrisis lower investment. The analysis indicates that weaker postcrisis fundamentals (valuation, pro…tability etc.) account for part of the lower corporate investment spending, but more importantly, ongoing re-structuring owing to large debts accumulated and the excess investment undertaken in the period leading up to the crisis appear to be the main factors weighing down the postcrisis investment. These …ndings support the hypothesis that the region's current account surpluses are a direct result of the …nancial crisis, and suggest that as restructuring completes its course and excess capacity wanes, investment rates could rise to reduce the current account surpluses.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows: in the next section, we review the pattern of global imbalances. In section 3, we describe the …rm-level data used for the analysis. Section 4 shows the e¤ect of the …nancial crisis on balance sheets of …rms and corporate investment. Section 5 estimates an econometric model of …rm investment and presents the results. In Section 6 we further analyze the unique role of excess debt on corporate investment, discuss the implications for the path of current account surpluses in Section 7, and conclude in Section 8. Table 1 presents the patterns of the global current account balances and highlights the importance of emerging Asia. The growing de…cit in the United States (U.S.), particularly since the Asian …nancial crisis, mirrors the growing surplus in emerging Asia. Adjusting the current accounts to exclude oil imports and exports paints a clear picture of U.S. de…cits almost totally o¤set by 4 emerging Asia's surpluses as indicated in Table 2 . 3 At the eve of the crisis in 1996, emerging Asia excluding China registered a $6 billion current account de…cit. The de…cit reversed to a $110 billion surplus in 1998 that widened further to over $200 billion in 2005. During the same period, China's current account surplus rose from $11 billion in 1996 to $214 billion in 2005. Emerging Asia as a whole remains the single largest counterpart to the U.S. current account balance, tallying a $416 billion surplus to the U.S. $556 billion de…cit, excluding oil, in 2005. This surplus is split nearly down the middle between China and the combined surplus in the Asia-8 region: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. These patterns of global current account balances popularized the conundrum that developing economies have turned into net exporters of capital, which contradicts theory suggesting that capital should ‡ow from capital-abundant advanced countries to capital-scarce developing countries where returns on capital are higher.
Pattern of Global Imbalances
As indicated in Figure 1 , the current account of the emerging Asia-8 economies switched from slight de…cits prior to the crisis to sustained surpluses averaging over 5 percent of GDP since 1998-around the time when the U.S. current account began to deteriorate. Figure 2 shows the current account surpluses for the Asia-8 economies in terms of the excess of national saving over investment. Saving rates on average have declined only slightly on balance, but investment rates dropped sharply from an average of about 33 percent between 1990 and 1997 to 25 percent in 1998, and have stayed at around this level ever since. 4 Figure 3 breaks down investment into private and public sector components. Nearly all of the decline in the aggregate investment rate can be attributed to private investment behavior, as the public sector's investment rate held steady at about 5 percent of GDP since 1991. The private investment rate on the other hand dropped signi…cantly during the crisis period, from over 27 percent of GDP in 1996 to below 20 percent in 1999. The drop in the private sector investment rate (even as the saving rates remained high) accounts for the swing in the current account from de…cits to surpluses among the Asia-8 economies since 1998, and appears to have played a large For our analysis, we use an unbalanced panel of annual …rm-level data from 1991 to 2005. The …rm-level data were constructed using information from the Worldscope Database and include data from 3,750 publicly listed companies in eight countries that were more a¤ected by the …nancial crisis.
Although data are available for some …rms prior to 1991, the coverage is generally quite thin prior to 1991 so we limit our sample to the period from 1991 to 2005. The number of …rms available in the Worldscope dataset grows substantially over the course of the sample period, which suggests that changes in sample composition may be an important issue. For this reason, we focus exclusively on regression estimates in the within dimension and control for identi…able …rm characteristics in order to limit the e¤ect on our estimates of changing sample composition.
We construct the following variables: The investment rate (I it =K it ), Tobin's Q (Q it ), the rate of cash ‡ow (CF it =K it ), the ‡ow of external …nancing (XF it =K it ), the debt-to-equity ratio (Debt it =Equity it ), debt-to-capital ratio (Debt it =K it ), and the ratio of short-term cash assets to capital (Cash it =K it ). In addition, in order to control for the e¤ect of …rm size on behavior, we constructed a binary variable for each …rm in each year using quartiles of their capital replacement values: Firms with capital holdings in the lowest quartile in any given year were de…ned as small (D sm it = 1), while …rms with holdings in the largest quartile are de…ned as large (D lg it = 1). To remove the e¤ect of outliers, we drop observations for any variable that are in the extreme tails (below the 1=4 percentile and above the 99 3=4 percentile) of the their cross-sectional distribution in any given year. Appendix B provides a detailed description of the Worldscope variables used and the data construction process.
Corporate Investment Before and After the Crisis
The guiding principle of our analysis is that aggregate variations in investment can only be explained by changes in fundamentals that cut across all …rms. For this reason, we begin by looking at the systematic components of investment and fundamentals before diving into a more detailed analysis.
Yearly variations in investment and each relevant fundamental can be decomposed into …xed e¤ects, aggregate e¤ects, group e¤ects for small and large …rms, and idiosyncratic components: the idiosyncratic component; f x i , a x t and e x it are the corresponding components of the vector x it . 5 Dummies for small and large …rms are included to control for group e¤ects related to the relative size of the …rm, which many studies have shown to a¤ect investment behavior. 6 We use panel regressions to estimate decompositions in (1). For each variable we normalize the year e¤ect to be zero in our base year of 1996-the year that immediately preceded the crisis. 7 The estimated year e¤ects in all other years capture the total e¤ect of latent aggregate factors relative to their e¤ect in this base year. Figure 4 shows the time path of our estimated year e¤ects for the investment rate, along with aggregate e¤ects for three commonly cited fundamentals: Tobin's Q, internal cash ‡ow, and the rate of return on assets (ROA). In Figure 5 , we plot the time path of estimated year e¤ects for external funding ‡ows and for 5 The …rm-level …xed e¤ect also controls for a number of e¤ects that cannot be separately identi…ed, including …xed …rm characteistics, country e¤ects, industry e¤ects, and an aggregate e¤ect for our baseline year of 1996.
6 These controls are warranted, even though we include …xed e¤ects, because the dataset is su¢ ciently long that the relative size of the incumbent …rms in our sample tends to increase over the course of the sample period.
7 By including controls for …rm size, we remove from the aggregate component the portion attributable to shifts in …rms between size categories from year to year. This is warranted because our time series is long enough that the size of a given …rm could change substantially within the sample. 7 some other selected …nancial indicators that may in ‡uence …rms' access to external funding: the debt-to-equity ratio, and ratios of debt obligations and cash holdings to capital. These indicators suggest that, on balance, …rms relied extensively on external …nancing in the leadup to the crisis, which resulted in a substantial buildup of debt relative to capital and equity on the eve of the turmoil even as pro…tability declined and cash holdings deteriorated. After the crisis, external …nancing dropped signi…cantly and debt levels moved down steadily.
This preliminary analysis suggests that the marked downturn in investment at the time of the crisis coincided with a broad deterioration in …rms'investment fundamentals and …nancial health.
But since the crisis, debt levels have gradually fallen and most fundamentals have shown signs of recovery that have not yet fed through to investment spending. One notable exception to this pattern is Tobin's Q, which has shown little signs of improvement. Theory suggests that Tobin's Q should, under ideal conditions, summarize all information that is pertinent for the current rate of investment. Taken at face value, the lack of meaningful improvement in Tobin's Q provides some rationale for the drop in investment over the postcrisis period. We explore more formally whether investment fundamentals are behind the drop in the postcrisis investment in the next section.
The intensity of the postcrisis investment drag appears to be similar across industries, countries, and …rm sizes. Figure 6 considers the country dimension, showing estimated year e¤ects from our panel of …rms for each of the Asia-8 countries. We obtain these estimates using a regression of the form shown in Equation (1) 8 Figure 8 shows the results from a similar exercise using dummies for …rm size. Firms in all three size categories have experienced postcrisis investment declines, and the e¤ect appears to have been stronger for smaller …rms. In sum, the shortfall in region's aggregate investment cuts across a wide spectrum of countries, industries, and …rms.
Determinants of Drag on Postcrisis Corporate Investment
Our econometric speci…cation is motivated by a standard value maximization problem for a competitive …rm that faces adjustment costs for capital (see Appendix A for details). The speci…cation relates the …rm's rate of investment
to its current value of Q, which is a valid summary of relevant investment fundamentals for a …rm that faces no …nancial constraints or costs that limit its ability to raise funding for investment and is small enough that it treats all prices as given. 8 We augment this speci…cation by including the same set of controls used in equation (1), along with additional …rm-speci…c variables intended to capture the e¤ect of restricted access to outside funding and other factors. Though these additional variables shouldn't matter under the idealized conditions set out above, empirical studies using …rm-level data provide ample reason to believe that internal cash ‡ows, non-price credit rationing, capital structure, and other factors in ‡uence investment even after controlling for Q. 9 For now, rather than estimating a full set of year e¤ects to capture unexplained aggregate variation, we restrict the time pattern of these e¤ects somewhat by simply including a single dummy variable for the crisis and postcrisis period (D
97+ t
). We also interact this postcrisis e¤ect with some of the …rm characteristics identi…ed above in order to allow the postcrisis e¤ect to vary for …rms with di¤erent selected characteristics:
where D HST i is a dummy that indicates whether …rm i is located in Hong Kong, Singapore or Taiwan, and D n i is a dummy variable that controls for all industries n = 1; : : : ; N , with the exception of our baseline industry n. 10 For practical reasons, we chose our baseline industry to be manufacturing, mainly because this category accounts for about three-…fths of the …rms in our sample. 11 Given this speci…cation, the coe¢ cient a p on the postcrisis dummy D 97+ t can be interpreted as the unexplained aggregate component of investment over the postcrisis period for our baseline …rm:
A medium-sized manufacturing entity located in Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, or the Philippines. The coe¢ cients on the various interaction terms show the incremental e¤ect on investment from latent aggregate factors for …rms with that speci…c attribute. For instance, the
represents the additional postcrisis e¤ect on investment for small …rms, over and above the baseline e¤ect for medium-sized …rms.
Results using variations of this speci…cation are shown in Table 3 . As a basis of comparison for subsequent estimates, the …rst column of the table shows results with no controls other than the postcrisis dummy and size e¤ects, while the estimates shown in the second column include all of the controls in equation (2) except the fundamentals x it . According to these estimates, the investment rate for our baseline …rm declined by about 12 percentage points in the postcrisis period, with a very narrow con…dence interval. This postcrisis drag did not di¤er in a statistically meaningful way for small and large …rms, but was about 7 1 2 percentage points less intense (but signi…cant nonetheless) for the countries in our sample that appear to have been less a¤ected by the crisis (Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore). 12 In the next steps of the analysis, we include other variables that could be relevant for investment in order to assess how much of the 12 percentage point postcrisis decline in the investment rate can be explained by fundamentals. As mentioned earlier, a voluminous empirical literature suggests that Q does not always summarize all the factors that are relevant for determining investment in practice. For this reason, we view Q as an imperfect proxy of a …rm's perceived investment prospects, and estimate alternative speci…cations that include additional controls for other funda-1 0 We include controls for the postcrisis e¤ect in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan because we felt the Asian …nancial crisis had less of an e¤ect on these countries, given a priori considerations. The results shown in Figure  6 suggest that South Korea might also be included in this group. Our results are not sensitive to this change in speci…cation.
1 1 More speci…cally, we include in our baseline all …rms whose SIC code has a …rst digit of either 2 or 3. These industry controls have almost no e¤ect on our results. 1 2 When one adds the postcrisis e¤ect to the incremental e¤ect for HTS countries, the combined e¤ect is 4 1 2 percent, with a standard error of about 0.1. 10 mentals such as internal cash ‡ows, external funding, and the debt-to-equity ratio. 13 Results using these speci…cations are presented in columns (2) through (5). When we simply include Tobin's Q in the regression as a proxy for time-series variation in investment opportunities, this reduces the contribution in the postcrisis period of latent aggregate factors to about 9 1 4 percentage points; the other variables explain even less. 14 To allow for the possibility that independent variations in these fundamentals may collectively explain the postcrisis investment drag, columns (6) through (8) percentage points from the baseline speci…cation-and it remains highly signi…cant. Column (7) includes the same variables in the third column, along with the debt-to-equity ratio, while column (8) adds both the debt-to-equity ratio and external funds. The estimates show that the debt-toequity ratio adds almost no additional explanatory power for the aggregate e¤ect (or investment in general) over and above Q and cash ‡ow. And, though we have strong reservations about whether the external funding ‡ow can be plausibly regarded as exogenous, including this information only seems to explain another percentage point of the aggregate e¤ect, leaving a still-substantial 7 1 2 percentage points unexplained.
The last column of the table considers whether the sensitivity of investment to any of these fundamentals has changed over the postcrisis period, which might give insights about the nature of the latent aggregate factors that appear to have held back capital spending. These estimates suggest no statistically signi…cant interaction between the postcrisis aggregate e¤ect and Tobin's Q or the debt-to-equity ratio. For external …nancing, the interaction is negative and statistically signi…cant, suggesting (subject to our caveat about endogeneity) that the e¤ect of the aggregate shock has been more intense for …rms that were more reliant on external …nancing prior to the crisis. In any case, although these interactions are intriguing, they explain little or none of the postcrisis e¤ect. Even the most favorable speci…cation shown in column (9) leaves unexplained 1 3 We include the debt to equity ratio because the …rm's required rate of return on capital-an important investment determinant-is generally a function of its debt-to-equity ratio, except under the special conditions described by Modigliani and Miller [1958] .
1 4 Though not a focus in this context, the estimated coe¢ cient on Q (0.023) is similar in magnitude compared to results from previous empirical work. The coe¢ cient on internal cash ‡ow is also in line with estimates in other studies.
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about one-half of the postcrisis drag on aggregate investment. Table 4 examines whether the unexplained portion of the aggregate drag on investment over the postcrisis period has been accentuated by cross-sectional di¤erences in …rms'balance sheets on the eve of the crisis. For this purpose, we interact our postcrisis dummy with readings for selected …rm-speci…c variables in 1996-the year that immediately preceded the crisis. We consider precrisis values of Tobin's Q, external …nancing, cash ‡ow, debt-to-equity, and debt-to-capital. Columns (1) through (4) indicate that variations across …rms'Tobin's Q, external …nancing, cash ‡ow, and the debt-to-equity ratio on the eve of the crisis do not help explain the postcrisis drag. However, when we condition the postcrisis e¤ect on the include the control for the debt-to-capital ratio at the eve of the crisis, we …nd-quite stunningly-that this interaction term essentially explains the remainder of the drop in the postcrisis investment rate. For this case, the postcrisis investment drag is reduced to about 2 percent, but it is not statistically signi…cant from zero. This suggests that the precrisis debt level a¤ected the magnitude of the postcrisis investment drag above and beyond what can be justi…ed by …rms'investment fundamentals. However, when we allow the year e¤ects to interact with the eve-of-the-crisis debt-to-capital ratio, the postcrisis investment drag is almost entirely accounted for. Taken at face value, these estimates suggest that while poorer fundamentals contributed to the drop in capital spending after the crisis-cross-sectional, variations in the debt-to-capital ratio on the eve of the crisis appear to be the single most important factor behind the postcrisis investment drag.
According to the estimates in this …gure, this debt hangover e¤ect has been attenuating in recent years. In the following section, we further explore this …nding in more detail.
ment Drag
To further understand the apparent debt hangover e¤ect identi…ed in the previous section, we plot in Figures 10 and 11 some characteristics of …rms grouped by their debt-to-capital distribution in 1996 (top quartile, mid quartiles, and bottom quartile). Firms in the top quartile of the 1996 debt-to-capital distribution accumulated sizeable debt obligations in the years leading up to the crisis. This is consistent with the substantial amount of capital that ‡owed into the region over this period, which-it is widely believed-re ‡ected the abundant credit availability for many …rms in this region. 15 In particular, the bulk of this debt build up appears to have been concentrated in …rms in the top quartile, whose debt levels exceeded both their total capital holding and the value of their equity. Indeed, for the rest of the …rms in our sample, debt levels remained relatively steady throughout the sample period. This debt accumulation by these high-debt …rms appears to have gone hand in hand with very high levels of capital spending: investment rates for these …rms rose to roughly 20 percent in 1996. This suggests that the debt-to-equity e¤ect identi…ed in the previous section might also be described as a capital overhang. To assess this conjecture, for excess precrisis investment by constructing a binary dummy variable that takes a value of one for …rms whose average investment rate in 1995 and 1996 was at least two standard deviations above the yearly cross-sectional mean. Interestingly, when we reestimate our regression with the debtoverhang variable replaced with an interaction between this crude proxy for overinvestment and the postcrisis dummy, the postcrisis investment drag also becomes insigni…cant (Column(6)). This suggests that these two variables largely capture the same e¤ect, which supporting the argument that …rms borrowed heavily to invest excessively. 16 On balance, this high investment occurred amid a backdrop of weakening fundamentals. For example, …rms in the high-debt group had lower values of Tobin's Q prior to the crisis than other …rms, and these values were dropping rapidly in 1995 and 1996. At the eve of the crisis, returns-on-assets and cash ‡ow had also declined sharply for the median …rm in this high-debt group.
As indicated earlier, investment declined the most during the crisis and the postcrisis drag was 1 5 See for example Ito [1999] or Calvo and Reinhart [1999] for extended discussions. 1 6 The result is preserved when we control for the interaction betweeen the postcrisis dummy and
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interacted with the postcrisis dummy. 13 more pronounced for the …rms in the top quartile of the 1996 debt-to-capital ratio distribution.
Tobin's Q has improved somewhat since the crisis, notably for …rms in the lower-debt group, but less so for …rms in the high-debt category. Nonetheless, Tobin's Q remains below the standard benchmark of "1", above which, theory suggests that …rms should resume investment spending.
Pro…tability and cash ‡ow have improved signi…cantly for all …rms including those in the high-debt group. External …nancing has also declined substantially for this group, turning negative since 1998, suggesting that they have been using generated cash ‡ows to repay debt accumulated during the runup to the crisis. Consistent with this observation, debt-to-capital and debt-to-equity ratios have fallen signi…cantly to levels comparable to those of other …rms. For …rms with lower debt, part of the cash ‡ow has been allocated to dividend payments, and investment has improved a bit for these …rms in the recent years.
All told, the evidence suggests the postcrisis investment drag is indeed a direct e¤ect of the …nancial crisis, rather than a consequence of deliberate government policies to boost the current account. Since the crisis, however, investment rates have remained low despite signi…cant improvements in fundamentals such as pro…tability and cash ‡ow, consistent with a scenario where excess capacity inherited from the precrisis period reduced the need for additional investment spending in the postcrisis period as indicated by lower values of Tobin's Q. The …nancial crisis e¤ect is most pronounced for high-debt …rms that, taken together, accounted for about 25 percent of total investment in 1996. These …rms apparently used high levels of debt …nancing to maintain excessive levels of capital spending during the runup to the crisis.
In theory, under ideal conditions, Tobin's Q should summarize all information that is relevant for a …rm's investment, including the e¤ect of large debts or excess capacity of capital. Under this ideal scenario, the level of debt prior to the crisis should not o¤er additional information that is relevant for the postcrisis investment behavior. Many empirical studies have documented that Tobin's Q falls well short of this standard in practice. We interpret our result as re ‡ecting violations of the assumptions that support the Q-theory of investment. Indeed, the debt can a¤ect investment by raising, for example, the agency cost of external …nancing. Whited [1992] …nds that including the e¤ect of a debt constraint in a standard …rm investment model greatly improves the model's performance, suggesting an important role for debt levels in investment behavior. 17 The drop in postcrisis investment that we document in this study could be rationalized along 1 7 See also Myers [1977] or Myers and Majluf (1984) for additional discussion. 14 two dimensions. In the …rst scenario, the excessive debt accumulated by many …rms prior to the crisis raised the perceived riskiness associated with providing capital to these …rms, boosting their postcrisis cost of capital and thereby pushing down their investment. In the second scenario, current investment levels, though lower, are consistent with desired levels of investment by these …rms given their perceived cost of capital. In this view, …rms have been e¢ ciently allocating their …nancial resources over the postcrisis period to pay down debts, pay out dividends, or to accumulate liquid assets that can be used to fund investment when solid prospects arise.
Due to data limitations, we are unable to analyze whether the drop in capital spending since the crisis has been associated with higher costs of external funding. Instead, we test whether the level of debt in 1996 a¤ected …rms' postcrisis investment response to changes in the cash ‡ow.
The rationale behind this test is that …rms that have more access to internal funds should be less a¤ected by funding limitations imposed from external sources. As such, the postcrisis investment drag for these …rms should be less intense for …rms with higher cash ‡ows and/or more ample liquid asset holdings. 18 Similarly, investment should be more sensitive to cash ‡ow for …rms that have accumulated more debt. We test both of these conjectures and report the results in columns (7) and (8).
For both of these cases, the results show no evidence that investment in the aftermath of the crisis was more sensitive to cash ‡ow, even when we restrict our regression sample to …rms in the top quartile of the 1996 debt distribution-column (8). In column (9), we test the second conjecture by interacting three variables: the postcrisis dummy, cash ‡ow, and the 1996 debt-to-capital variable.
This interaction term captures di¤erences in the sensitivity of the postcrisis investment to cash ‡ow for …rms with greater debt holdings on the eve of the crisis. If high debt inherited from the crisis is restraining investment by raising the cost of external funds, we would expect the postcrisis investment by …rms with higher precrisis debt holdings to be more sensitive to cash ‡ow than …rms with lower precrisis debt. The coe¢ cient on this interaction term is negative and statistically signi…cant. At best, the result suggests that the postcrisis investment was less (not more) sensitive to cash ‡ow for …rms with high precrisis debt levels.
In sum, the evidence suggests that higher costs of external funding were not behind the drop in capital expenditures since crisis. Instead, it appears that investment prospects were not strong enough to encourage higher investment spending beyond the capacity inherited from the precrisis period. As a result, …rms allocated internal funds to accumulate liquid assets, make dividend payments and, in the case of high-debt …rms, repay debt. In the next section, we review possible implications for the future adjustment of the current accounts balances.
7 Discussion and Implications for Adjustment of Current Accounts Though it seems hard to believe that the adverse e¤ects of the Asian …nancial crisis can still a¤ect investment decisions after a decade, the results from this study indicate that the e¤ect of the 1997 …nancial crisis continues to be a drag on …rm investment. This drag in investment has played a big role in generating the current account surpluses in emerging Asia, and has enabled the region to export capital as the anemic domestic investment is unable to absorb the region's savings. The most important factor weighing on investment is the e¤ect of excessive debt and excess investment that occurred in the years leading up to the crisis. As restructuring completes its course and excess capacity wanes, it is conceivable that corporate investment will continue to improve. We believe, however, that investment rates would likely not rise back up to the highs seen in the period leading up to the crisis. Since roughly one-third of the postcrisis investment drag can be attributed to fundamentals, it seems reasonable to expect investment rates to recoup only one-third of their declines after the e¤ect of the crisis dissipates. For aggregate investment rates, this would imply increases in the vicinity of 3 percentage points, contributing to an equivalent reduction in current account surpluses all else equal.
The results from this study have implications that present challenges for some alternative explanations for emerging Asia's current account surpluses. Recent papers by Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber argue that the current account surpluses in emerging market economies are the result of deliberate government policies to promote export led-growth. According to this explanation, investment from domestic sources is ine¢ cient for fostering growth and emerging market economies require foreign direct investment to reach their development objectives. This argument suggests that current account surpluses are necessary to accumulate assets that are in turn invested in developed economies as potential collateral to induce inward foreign direct investment (FDI) from those developed countries (see Garber, 2003, 2004) . A similar line of argument by Mann [2004] suggests that the current account surpluses in Asia are the result of a shift in policy to promote export-led growth after domestic-led growth in the early 1990s resulted in the Asian …nancial crisis. Yet another popular explanation attributes emerging Asia's surpluses to underdeveloped …nancial systems that are unable to intermediate domestic saving (Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian [2006] ) or to ful…ll local residents'needs for high quality foreign …nancial assets (Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull [2007] ).
An implication for these various explanations is that Asia's current account surpluses would persist for the foreseeable future. While the results from this study do not directly refute these explanations, they rationalize the current account surpluses in a way that suggests that the surpluses need not persist. The study documents the predominant e¤ect of the role of the …nancial crisis on current account surpluses through its adverse e¤ect on …rms' balance sheets. As …rms complete the restructuring of their balance sheets and prospects strengthen, investment could rise to reduce the current account surpluses. However, it remains unlikely that investment rates would rise to the highs seen in the years leading up to the crisis as these rates seem to have been fueled by investment beyond levels supported by fundamentals. Eliminating the region's current account surpluses would require reductions in the region's savings rates which are among the highest in the world.
Conclusion
This study reviewed the role of emerging Asia's current account surpluses in global imbalances and assessed the unique role of the …nancial crisis using a cross-country data set of 3,750 …rms. The results indicated that the current account surpluses in the region are a direct result of the e¤ect of the …nancial crisis. In the aftermath of the crisis, corporate expenditures on …xed investment declined signi…cantly, contributing to lower aggregate investment rates. The shortfall in corporate spending generated investment that fell short of saving, turning the region into a net exporter of capital. We then considered the factors behind the postcrisis lower investment rates.
Our analysis indicated that weaker postcrisis fundamentals account for a portion of the lower investment rates, but ongoing re-structuring owing to large debts accumulated and the excess investment undertaken in the period leading up to the crisis are the main factors weighing on the postcrisis corporate investment. These results support the hypothesis that the region's current account surpluses are a direct result of private restructuring behavior in response to the …nancial crisis. As this restructuring completes it course, investment rates will likely rise to reduce the region's current account surpluses, contrary to alternative explanations for Asia's current account surpluses that imply that they will persist for the foreseeable future. We do not, however, expect investment rates to rise back up to the unsustainable levels that prevailed at the eve of the crisis.
A full adjustment of the surpluses would require reductions in the region's saving rates. Future research on the determinants and prospect of the region's saving rates is well indicated.
Appendix A A Neoclassical Model of Corporate Investment
Our theoretical framework for …rm investment is motivated by a fairly standard neoclassical qtheory of investment where …rms face adjustment costs for adjusting their capital stock. Brie ‡y summarizing this framework, we assume that markets are perfectly competitive, that all market participants share the same costless information, and that …rms face no internal adjustment costs other than those for capital. The neoclassical …rm chooses an investment rate that maximizes the market value of its future cash ‡ows from capital, which is represented by the value function (see also Hubbard [1998] ):
where K i;t+1 is given by the following capital accumulation condition:
In this formulation, i and t denote the …rm and time period respectively, and is the relevant discount factor for future cash ‡ows. ( ) is the …rm's (gross) pro…t function, which, after optimizing out variable production factors, is a function of its current capital stock K i;t and a random variable i;t that captures changes in productivity and/or the market price of variable inputs. The …rm treats i;t as given.
( ) is a function that captures internal capital adjustment costs, I i;t investment, p t is the relative price of capital goods net of the capitalized value of future tax shields.
The random variable " it is an adjustment cost shock that is observed by the …rm but not by econometricians, and i is the rate of depreciation of capital for …rm i. E t [ ] is an expectation conditional on information available at time t.
The …rst-order condition for value maximization provides the following familiar investment equation:
where q i;t is marginal q: The shadow value to the …rm of an incremental unit of capital in the following period, reckoned in terms of capital. In turn, this shadow value is the present value of anticipated cash ‡ows that the …rm expects from a marginal increase in next period's capital stock, in units of capital: Equation (5) shows that -given the form of the adjustment cost function, its capital stock, and the adjustment cost shock " it -marginal q is su¢ cient to determine the …rm's current investment ‡ow.
To obtain an econometric model, we assume that the adjustment cost function takes the following quadratic form:
which is linearly homogeneous in capital and investment. Substituting equation (6) into equation (5) provides the following structural equation:
Assuming that, as in Hayashi [1982] , the …rm is a price taker in all markets, its pro…t function is linear in capital (which requires that the production function be linearly homogenous in all inputs), and …nancing and investment decisions are independent, the shadow value of capital in equation (7) can be replaced with the average value of capital Q it , where the value of the …rm is measured excluding the current dividend. This yields the following reduced-form speci…cation:
where we have assumed that each …rm's adjustment cost shock " i;t is composed of three separate components: A …rm-level …xed e¤ect f i , a latent e¤ect a t that is common to all …rms, and an idiosyncratic e¤ect " it that varies randomly over time.
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For each …rm in our panel, annual values of each variable are determined as follows:
The replacement value of capital ( p it K it ) for each …rm in a given year is determined by taking the …rm's total asset value less the value of its current assets, where variables are as recorded by Worldscope at the end of the preceding year. For a few …rms there were gaps in the book value data from Worldscope. In these cases, we …lled in these missing data for the nominal capital stock in these years by assuming that the real stock grew at a constant rate su¢ cient to reconcile the available capital stocks at the beginning and endpoints of the gap.
In the process of making this calculation, we converted nominal capital stocks to real (and vice versa) using yearly values of the aggregate investment de ‡ator for the country where the …rm was located.
The market value of capital (p it V it ) in a given year is the sum of the market value of the …rms' equity (share price times the number of common shares outstanding) plus the book value of its debt minus the book value of its current assets, as recorded in Worldscope balance sheet information for the end of the preceding year.
Investment rates
for each …rm in each year are determined by taking from the …rm's Worldscope cash ‡ow statement its uses of cash to acquire …xed assets, netting out sources of cash from sales of property, plant and equipment, and then dividing this net total by the replacement value of the …rm's capital.
Cash ‡ow
is the …rm's cash ‡ow from operations (as recorded in the Worldscope cash ‡ow statement) divided by the replacement value of its capital.
Tobin's Q (Q it ) is the total market value of the …rm's capital divided by the replacement value of the …rm's capital.
Debt-to-equity ratio
Debt it Equity it of a …rm is the current value of its equity divided by the book value of its debt, where the calculation of both variables are as described above.
External …nancing
is calculated by dividing the …rm's ‡ow of funding from external sources (as recorded in the Worldscope cash ‡ow statement) by the replacement value of the 21 …rm's capital.
Debt-to-capital ratio
Debt it K it of a …rm is the book value of the …rm's debt in the current year divided by the replacement value of its capital.
Cash-to-capital ratio
is the value of the …rm's cash investments in the current year (as recorded in Worldscope balance sheet information) divided by the replacement value of its capital.
Return on assets is the Worldscope estimate for the current year, calculated as current net income before preferred dividends plus current after tax interest expenses, all divided by the total book value of assets in the previous year. 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 Year Investment Saving 
